Kroger Co. v. Morris: The Diminution of Hearing Officers by Seltzer, Cullen D.
University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 27 | Issue 4 Article 15
1993
Kroger Co. v. Morris: The Diminution of Hearing
Officers
Cullen D. Seltzer
University of Richmond
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Workers' Compensation Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cullen D. Seltzer, Kroger Co. v. Morris: The Diminution of Hearing Officers, 27 U. Rich. L. Rev. 943 (1993).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss4/15
KROGER CO. v. MORRIS: THE DIMINUTION OF HEARING
OFFICERS
I. INTRODUCTION
In Kroger Co. v. Morris" the Court of Appeals of Virginia reached two
contradictory conclusions. On one hand the court held that the Virginia
Workers' Compensation Commission could overrule a deputy commis-
sioner's fact findings based solely on evidence contained in the record be-
low. 2 On the other hand, the court concluded that it was itself unable to
make such fact findings based solely on the record.3
In Kroger, the deputy commissioner ruled that inconsistencies in Mor-
ris' several accounts of his injuries made his case incredible.4 The full
Commission, on review of the record, but without calling witnesses,5
found that the substance of Morris' accounts was credible and overruled
the deputy commissioner.6 On appeal Kroger argued that the full Com-
mission's reversal of the deputy commissioner was arbitrary, and there-
fore, reversible error.7 The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the
decision of the Commission."
This note will address two questions that stem from these facts. First,
what deference does the full Commission owe to the fact findings of a
deputy commissioner? Second, what deference does the court of appeals
owe the full Commission's fact findings when those findings are based
solely on a record compiled by a deputy commissioner? Finally, the note
asserts that the full Commission should give substantially more deference
to its deputies than it presently demonstrates and that on judicial review
1. 14 Va. App. 233, 415 S.E.2d 879 (1992). According to the Office of the Clerk of the
Court of Appeals of Virginia, no appeal to this decision had been noted. The time period in
which to note an appeal expired on April 30, 1992. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:14.
2. Kroger, 14 Va. App. at 236, 415 S.E.2d at 881.
3. Id. at 236-37, 415 S.E.2d at 881.
4. Id. at 236, 415 S.E.2d at 881.
5. The full Commission may, in its discretion, review a case de novo. VA..CoDE ANN.
§ 65.2-705(A) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
6. Kroger, 14 Va. App. at 236-37, 415 S.E.2d at 880-81.
7, Id. Note that there is some confusion here as to what exactly the full Commission said
regarding Morris' credibility. Kroger Company argued that the full Commission made no
finding regarding Morris' credibility, and in fact relied upon that assertion in part to bolster
its claim that the full Commission acted arbitrarily. The court of appeals made no reference
to any specific finding by the full Commission, but noted summarily that "the full commis-
sion could make its own credibility determination. Its finding is supported by the evidence."
Id. (citation omitted). This note assumes that the full Commission, explicitly or implicitly,
made a finding about a witness' credibility, contrary to that of the deputy commissioner.
8. Id.
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the court of appeals should have broader latitude to weigh the contents of
the record against the full Commission's findings.
II. WHAT LAW APPLIES
As a threshold matter, one should note that the workers' compensation
statute governs hearings before the Commission.9 The statute provides
that the Commission, or any of its members or deputies, shall hear work-
ers' compensation matters. 10 If the hearing is not initially presented
before the full Commission, the full Commission shall, on petition, review
the case. 1 Section 65.2-706 of the Code of Virginia provides in relevant
part that "[t]he award of the [Workers' Compensation] Commission...
shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact .... 12 Appeals
shall lie from such award to the Court of Appeals [sic] in the manner
provided in the Rules of the Supreme Court."'"3 Rule 5A:11 of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia provides that decisions of the full Commission
may be appealed to the court of appeals as a matter of right. 4
III. VIRGINIA LAW PRIOR TO Kroger
In general, the fact findings of a deputy commissioner are not binding
on the full Commission. 5 A limited exception, however, is made for dep-
uty commissioners' findings regarding witness credibility.16 Even when a
deputy commissioner makes a finding regarding witness credibility, the
full Commission is not necessarily bound. Rather, to the extent that the
deputy commissioner makes a specific, recorded finding of a witness' de-
meanor or appearance, and predicates some portion of her decision on
that finding, the full Commission "may not arbitrarily disregard" that
finding. 1 If the finding of credibility, or lack thereof, is predicated on the
substance of the witness' testimony and not the witness' demeanor, the
full Commission may make a credibility determination as readily as the
deputy.' 8
9. The Virginia Administrative Procedure Act expressly exempts workers' compensation
award hearings from its purview. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4.1(D)(2) (Cure. Supp. 1992).
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-704 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
11. Id. § 65.2-705 (Repi. Vol. 1991).
12. Id. § 65.2-706 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
13. Id. § 65.2-706(A) (Repl. Vol. 1991) (emphasis added).
14. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5A:11.
15. Williams v. Auto Brokers, 6 Va. App. 570, 573, 370 S.E.2d 321, 323 (1988).
16. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pierce, 5 Va. App. 374, 382, 363 S.E.2d 433, 437
(1987).
17. Id. at 382, 363 S.E.2d at 437 (emphasis added); see also Williams, 6 Va. App. 570, 370
S.E.2d 321 (1988)(holding that full Commission can reverse even demeanor-based fact find-
ings of a Deputy so long as it makes reference to credible evidence in the record).
18. Pierce, 5 Va. App. at 382, 363 S.E.2d at 437.
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The court of appeals owes far greater deference to the fact findings of
the full Commission. Although Code of Virginia section 65.2-706 provides
that the fact findings of the full Commission are "conclusive and binding"
on appeal,19 that rule alone conveys little in terms of what standard for
determining error is to be applied. Over time the courts have discerned a
standard of review. As long as the full Commission's findings are based
upon "credible evidence," they will not be overturned.20 Courts have fur-
ther construed the standard to mean that "[ilf there is evidence, or rea-
sonable inferences can be drawn from the evidence, to support the Com-
mission's findings, they will not be disturbed on review, even though
there is evidence in the record to support a contrary finding."'2'
Although the court in Kroger did not posit why the judiciary should be
so deferential to the full Commission, case law and intuition provide some
rationale. First is the clear expression of the legislature's intent in Code
of Virginia section 65.2-704.22 As noted above, however, a blanket asser-
tion that fact findings are "binding and conclusive" hardly announces a
standard of review.2 s
Courts also frequently defer to administrative fact findings on the
grounds that administrative agencies have a special expertise courts do
not share. "An administrative agency is expected 'to apply expert dis~re-
tion to the matters coming within its cognizance.' "24 In Metropolitan
Cleaning Corporation v. Crawley,'5 the Court of Appeals of Virginia ar-
gued that deference to the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission
as a fact finder is appropriate because the Commission "'acquires an ex-
pertise and accumulates an experience in [its] limited, specialized field
often more extensive than that of the judiciary.' ",26
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-706(A) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
20. Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Bowman, 229 Va. 249, 251, 329 S.E.2d 15, 16 (1985); Caskey v.
Dan River Mills, Inc. 225 Va. 405, 411, 302 S.E.2d 507, 510 (1983); Fairfax Hosp. v. De-
LaFleur, 221 Va. 406, 410, 270 S.E.2d 720, 722 (1980); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6
Va. App. 1, 12, 365 S.E.2d 782, 788 (1988).
21. Morris v. Badger Powhatan/Figgie Int'l, Inc., 3 Va. App. 276, 279, 348 S.E.2d 876, 877
(1986) (citing Caskey, 225 Va. at 411, 302 S.E.2d at 510-11 (1983)) (emphasis added).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-704 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
23. Although the statute's plain language does not indicate a precise standard of review,
"binding and conclusive" probably does preclude a de novo trial on appeal. See Brown v.
Fox, 189 Va. 509, 516, 54 S.E.2d 109, 113 (1949)(holding that findings of fact, if supported
by credible evidence, are binding on appeal); 1A MIcHIE'S JURISPRUDENCE Administrative
Law § 18 (1990).
24. Metropolitan Cleaning Corp. v. Crawley, 14 Va. App. 261, 265, 416 S.E.2d 35, 38
(1992)(citing Virginia ABC Comra'n v. York St. Inn, Inc., 220 Va. 310, 315, 257 S.E.2d 851,
855 (1979) (quoting Schmidt v. Board of Adjustment, 88 A.2d 607, 615-16 (N.J. 1952)).
25. 14 Va. App. 261, 416 S.E.2d 35 (1992).
26. Id. at 38 (quoting Dunton v. Eastern Fine Paper Co., 423 A.2d 512, 514 (Me. 1980). In
support of this general proposition that courts ought to defer to agencies because of the
latter's special expertise, the Virginia Court of Appeals in Crawley cited the following none
of which are Virginia cases: Brown v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd. (Transworld
19931 945
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The court in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Pierce27 held that the
relationship between a deputy commissioner and the Commission was
analogous to that between a commissioner in chancery and a chancellor to
the extent that the fact findings of the former are due some deference by
the latter. "Even where the commissioner's findings of fact have been dis-
approved, an appellate court must give due regard to the commissioner's
ability, not shared by the chancellor, to see, hear, and evaluate the wit-
nesses at first hand." 8 Significantly, however, the Goodyear court
adopted that rationale not for the proposition that in certain cases appel-
late courts should defer to the full Commission, but for the proposition
that in some instances, such as when witness demeanor is at issue, the full
Commission should defer to a deputy commissioner.2 9
Finally, common sense argues that in the interests of judicial economy,
appellate courts ought to leave fact finding to lower courts. Where an ad-
ministrative agency decision is appealed the logic is the same; appellate
courts are simply ill-equipped to try cases de novo and the judiciary in
general is ill-equipped to try cases more than once.30
The Kroger court articulated none of these rationales supporting judi-
cial deference to the fact findings of the Commission. The court in Kroger
cited the de rigueur language about credible evidence supporting the
findings of the Commission and almost conclusively recited some of the
evidence that tended to substantiate Morris' claim that he was a credible
witness. At no point did the court of appeals weigh the evidence in favor
of Morris against the evidence in favor of Kroger, nor did the court of
appeals ever assay the deputy's report as evidence at all.
The court declined to discuss the weight of the deputy's report because
the report's weight was limited to any finding the report may have made
Airlines), 476 A.2d 900, 902 (Pa. 1984); Szumski v. Dale Boat Yards, Inc., 226 A.2d 11, 16,
cert. denied, 387 U.S. 944 (N.J. 1967); Tallman v. Arkansas Best Freight, 767 P.2d 363, 369
(N.M.Ct. App. 1988); Wright's Furniture Mill, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 707 P.2d
113, 114 (Utah 1985); Metropolitan Cleaning Corp., 14 Va. App. at 266, 416 S.E.2d at 38.
However, in Roanoke Water Works Co. v. Commonwealth, 137 Va. 348, 119 S.E. 268 (1923),
the Virginia Supreme Court held that deference to the State Corporation Commission was
appropriate because of a constitutional mandate to defer and because of the SCC's experi-
ence in dealing with matters within its jurisdiction. Id.
27. 5 Va. App. 374, 363 S.E.2d 433 (1987).
28. Id. at 382, 363 S.E.2d at 437 (1987)(quoting Hill v. Hill, 227 Va. 569, 577, 318 S.E.2d
292, 297 (1984)).
29. Note, however, that the full Commission in Kroger did not have the benefit of hearing
testimony, yet it reversed the deputy.
30. Although in certain instances, such as habeas corpus, facts and issues may be func-
tionally "re-tried" as a general proposition, litigants are entitled to but one opportunity to
prove facts. See Keeney v. Tamago-Reyes, 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992) (allowing litigation of fed-
eral constitutional claims in federal court after a state criminal conviction only if the habeas
corpus petitioner can show "cause and prejudice").
946 [Vol. 27:943
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with respect to a witness's demeanor or appearance.31 Having concluded
that the deputy made no credibility findings based on appearance and
demeanor, the court effectively concluded that the deputy's report was
irrelevant to the question on appeal regarding sufficiency of the
evidence.32
IV. COMPARING VIRGINIA LAW TO FEDERAL LAW
In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB33 the United States Supreme
Court, interpreting the Taft-Hartley Act and the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), held that an NLRB examiner's report is as much a
part of the record as the Board's report and must therefore be considered
when examining an NLRB decision for substantiality.
3 4
The federal approach differs in two significant respects from Virginia's
approach insofar as judicial deference to administrative fact finding is
concerned. First, the federal approach is less tolerant of an agency's cava-
lier attitude regarding a hearing officer's findings. Regardless of whether
the hearing officer has predicated his findings on a witness's demeanor,
the agency is not free to disregard the hearing officer's conclusions. 5 Uni-
versal Camera quoted with approval, although it did not make
mandatory, the following language from the Attorney General's Commit-
tee on Administrative Procedure: "In general the relationship upon ap-
peal between the hearing commissioner and the agency ought to a consid-
erable extent to be that of trial court to appellate court."36 The Court in
Universal Camera cautioned, however, that such a rationale did not re-
31. Kroger Co. v. Morris, 14 Va. App. 233, 236, 415 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1992). See discussion
of weight of deputy's findings, supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
32. Kroger, 14 Va. App. at 236, 415 S.E.2d at 881.
33. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). This case also decided that agency findings would be upheld if
based upon "substantial evidence" and that in examining a decision for substantiality, re-
viewing courts would not view the evidence isolated from the record, but rather would weigh
the evidence against the "whole record." Id. at 487 (relying on the "mood" expressed by
Congress.) An NLRB hearing examiner is analogous to a deputy commissioner and the
NLRB to the full worker's compensation commission. See Recent Decisions, Administrative
Law, 37 VA. L. REv. 871, 873 (1951).
34. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 493.
35. Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 496 ("We intend only to recognize that evidence sup-
porting a conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who
has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different from the
Board's than when has reached the same conclusion." (emphasis added)) See Supreme
Court, 1950 Term 65 HARv. L. REv. 107, 163 (1951)(arguing that the "courts will be more
ready than before to reverse the agencies" and that courts' beliefs regarding agency bias will
have an "unarticulated influence on the judicial readiness to accept the administrative
findings.").
36. Universal Camera, 494 U.S. at 492 (quoting the United States Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure, Final Report at 51).
Conclusions, interpretations, law, and policy should, of course, be open to full review.
On the other hand, on matters which the hearing commissioner, having heard the
9471993]
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quire the examiner's findings to be given "more weight than in reason and
in the light of judicial experience they deserve.',
Second, the federal approach anticipates that an appellate court, as
well as the agency, will automatically consider the effect of the examiner's
report, regardless of the outcome of the case. In applying the substantial
evidence test on the basis of the whole record, the federal APA requires
that the agency's findings be weighed against evidence in opposition to
the agency's conclusions.3 8 In Kroger v. Morris, as noted above, the court
of appeals considered only that evidence which operated to support the
full Commission in its review of whether "credible evidence" supported
the full Commission's findings."'
V. WHICH LAW MAKES BETTER SENSE?
Virginia practice differs from federal practice because of the different
jurisdictions' approaches to judicial review. Whereas federal courts will
review the entire record of the agency adjudication in order to determine
whether substantial evidence exists to support the agency finding, Vir-
ginia courts look only to see if "credible evidence" supports an agency
finding.4°
That difference in approach explains the narrower grounds upon which
Virginia courts will review agency findings, and insofar as Kroger v. Mor-
ris is concerned, the limited deference reviewing courts give to deputy
commissioners. If the Virginia courts intend to adopt a policy of giving
evidence and seen the witnesses, is best qualified to decide, the agency should be
reluctant to disturb his findings unless error is clearly shown.
Id.
The quote from Universal Camera might be explained by an analogy to mathematics. If
one allocates units of measure to bits of evidence, one might compare the weight of the
evidence as a proportion. One unit out of four might be considered substantial, if one as-
sumes that the four units are comprised of bits of evidence that do not include the hearing
officer's findings. However, if one added the hearing officer's findings, and they added four
more units, one unit out of eight might not be considered substantial. The difficult part is of
course assigning units to bits of evidence; therein lies the weighing process.
37. Id. at 496. The Court went on to say:
The significance of his [the hearing examiner's] report, of course, depends largely on
the importance of credibility in the particular case. To give it this significance does
not seem to us materially more difficult than to heed the other factors which in sum
determine whether evidence is 'substantial.'
Id. at 496-97.
38. Id. at 417-78.
39. The court did not compare the deputy's findings with the Commission's findings, but
observed only that the Commission's findings were sufficient in and of themselves to merit
affirmance. Kroger Co. v. Morris, 14 Va. App. 233, 236-37, 415 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1992).
40. Morris v. Badger Powhatan/Figgie Int'l, Inc., 3 Va. App. 276, 279, 348 S.E.2d 876, 877
(1986).
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credence to agency decisions, one can scarcely complain that intermedi-
ate, or subordinate branches of an agency are given little deference.
On the other hand, to the extent that litigants view deputy commis-
sioners as institutional manifestations of a fair hearing, the extent to
which deputies are easily overruled diminishes the litigants' fair hear-
ing.4 1 Consider the reasons that might justify this lower degree of defer-
ence to a deputy.
Although the Workers' Compensation Commission may have a measure
of expertise with respect to those sorts of cases, that reason provides little
support for the proposition that the court of appeals should not give
credence to the deputy commissioner. First, the deputy commissioner
may have as much expertise as the full Commission, and therefore addi-
tional deference to the full Commission might be unwarranted. More im-
portantly, however, the issue in Kroger, whether to believe the plaintiff or
not, required no particular expertise. The full Commission simply re-
viewed the plausibility of the plaintiff's sometimes conflicting accounts of
his injury.42 Finally, because appeals from the full Commission are taken
to the court of appeals as a matter of right, one might fairly speculate
that the judges of the court of appeals may have also cultivated some
expertise in the field.
43
The facts in Kroger are ill-suited to the argument that the court of
appeals should defer to the full Commission because the trier of fact had
the better opportunity to see and understand the case first hand. As
noted above, the full Commission reversed the deputy without calling a
single witness, and solely on the basis of the printed record. In the ab-
sence of a specific, recorded observation about the witness' demeanor by
the deputy commissioner, the court of appeals concluded that the hearing
officer's findings were essentially irrelevant to the question of whether the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the full Commission's findings.
44
41. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Hewitt v. Helms, 459
U.S. 460 (1983); Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). These cases discuss
the due process implications of administrative hearings and establish the well-settled pro-
position that due process considerations attach to administrative hearings. Note, however,
that these cases recognize the equally well-settled proposition that not all liberty and prop-
erty interests merit the same procedural safeguards.
42. "Deputy Commissioner Costa's determination of Morris' credibility was based on the
evidence and the substance of Morris' testimony, rather than on Morris' appearance or de-
meanor." Therefore, the full Commission could make its own credibility determination. Kro-
ger Co. v. Morris, 14 Va. App. 233, 236, 415 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1992) (citation omitted).
43. According to the Clerk of the Virginia Court of Appeals, of the 2611 cases filed with
that court in 1992, 340 were Workers' Compensation cases. Telephone Interview with Patri-
cia Davis, Clerk of the Virginia Court of Appeals (February 3, 1993). Thus, approximately
thirteen percent of the Court's caseload consists of Workers' Compensation cases.
44. Kroger, 14 Va. App. at 236, 415 S.E.2d at 881.
1993]
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Even in the event that the deputy commissioner makes no observation
about a particular witness' credibility, one strains credulity to argue that
appearance, demeanor, and the overall nature of the hearing did not con-
vey some sense of right or wrong to the hearing officer, and did not in
some way affect his decision. If one concludes as the court of appeals did,
the necessary result is that actually being at the hearing meant nothing;
that essentially the parties could have mailed their testimony in to the
deputy. Such a conclusion presumes too much.45
The sum of this analysis is to suggest that the Virginia approach of
giving weight to the findings of deputy commissioners is ill-advised. To
the extent that this approach is a result of Virginia's inclination to give
only limited judicial review to the adjudications of the Workers' Compen-
sation Commission, that inclination is also ill-advised.
Parties are entitled to expect that their formal hearing is not for ap-
pearances alone. The full Commission ought not be able to disregard the
result of what amounts to a trial, solely on the basis of finding some cred-
ible evidence with which to support a reversal. More significantly, the
court of appeals should not find itself constrained to hamstring itself in
order to give effect to fact findings that might have some credible sup-
port, but in light of the whole record, are insubstantial.46
Cullen D. Seltzer
45. Recall the observation made in Universal Camera that hearing officers who have lived
with a case bring a certain weight to their findings. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 496 (1951).
46. Note that this theoretical result is not necessarily the one that follows in practice.
Arguably, if a judge believes that a significant injustice is being done as a result of a full
Commission finding, regardless of the standard, that judge will simply define the standard
by the offensive conduct. For a discussion of this sort of analysis, see Charles M. Harrison,
The West Virginia Administrative Procedure Act, 66 W. VA. L. REv. 159, 189 (1964).
One should be careful not to overstate the limitations on the court of appeals. As dis-
cussed above, the court has an obligation to reverse where no credible evidence exists, and
need not affirm as true facts which it knows to be false. Board of Supervisors v. Lucas, 142
Va. 84, 94, 128 S.E. 574, 577 (1925).
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